Abstract: Public choice theory takes citizens as rationally ignorant about political issues, because the costs of being informed greatly exceed the utility individuals derive from it. The costs of information (supply side) as well as the utility of information (demand side), however, can vary substantially depending on the political system under which citizens live. Using survey data from the European Union and Switzerland, we present empirical evidence that citizens are politically better informed when they have more extended political participation rights. The results corroborate theoretical arguments and circumstantial evidence that voter information should be treated as endogenously determined by political institutions. (100 words)
Introduction
Democracy rests on a dilemma: On the one hand, as Downs (1957) noted, voters have low incentives to inform themselves on political issues. As an individual vote is most unlikely to change the overall outcome at the ballots, voters will not only tend to abstain from an election or a vote, but also remain 'rationally ignorant' about the alternatives to decide on. On the other hand, it is widely believed that well informed citizens are an essential prerequisite for a well functioning and stable democracy. If citizens do not have sufficient information about the policies or governments they vote for, they may be disappointed by the actual consequences of their decisions, which in turn can undermine the acceptance and legitimacy of democracy as a political system. Public choice scholars have indicated several ways out of this dilemma. It has been argued that in reality, a variety of institutions exist that lower citizens' information costs. Perhaps most importantly, voters can use party ideologies to proxy for the 'true' consequences of their vote. But they also use other information 'shortcuts'. Citizens pay attention to the past performance of a government (for a survey on vote and popularity functions, see Nannestad and Paldam 1994); they judge the reputation of candidates McCubbins 1998, Popkin 1991) ; they evaluate voting recommendations by interest groups (Schneider 1985 , Lupia 1994 , Bowler and Donovan 1998 , Christin et al. 2002 ); or they collect political information as a by-product of mass media consumption.
In one way or another, all these approaches analyze how information costs are reduced within a given political system.
In this paper, we attempt to analyze the relationship between information and democracy from a somewhat different angle. We empirically test whether the level of voter information itself is dependent on the political system under which citizens live.
The idea that voters' awareness of political issues should be treated as endogenously determined by political institutions has been advanced by several authors (e.g. Cronin 1989 , Bohnet and Frey 1994 , Frey 1994 and Kirchgässner, Feld and Savioz 1999 . 1 They theoretically argue that a political system that gives citizens more political participation possibilities will change the demand for political information as well as the supply of it. As an illustrative example, the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty in various European countries is used. In the countries where citizens had the right to vote on it (e.g. Denmark), politicians had to engage much more in explaining the Treaty to the citizens than in countries where no referendum took place (e.g. Germany). For the citizens, on the other hand, the incentives to be informed were greater, as the intense discussions before the referendum transformed the fact of 'having a reasoned opinion' partly into a private good. Casual observation suggests that, as a consequence, information levels on the content of the Treaty were high among Danish citizens. This and other examples offer suggestive evidence that voters are better informed when they have a larger say in the political process; however, there is a lack of more systematic evidence in the literature. In this paper, we conduct an empirical investigation in an attempt to partly fill this gap.
We study voter information in two contexts. First, survey data from the Eurobarometer series is used to systematically investigate how referenda in several European countries affected citizens' information on the European Union (EU). The results indicate that people in countries with a referendum are in fact "objectively" better informed (according to ten questions about the EU in the 1996 Eurobarometer) as well as they feel "subjectively" better informed about the EU after a referendum (Eurobarometer 1992 (Eurobarometer -1997 . As a second empirical test, we look at voter information in Switzerland, where the extent of citizens' political participation rights differs substantially among the 26 Swiss cantons. This unique institutional variation can be used to explain differences in voter information obtained from a large survey conducted among the Swiss electorate in 1996. Again, we find that citizens living in more direct democratic jurisdictions are 1 Advocates of direct or participatory democracy have argued for years that more 'self-governance' would increase citizens' competence and interest in communal life (e.g. Barber 1984 , Mansbridge 1983 and objectively better informed about politics. The results also indicate that political participation possibilities raise discussion intensity, which in the literature is seen as an important transmission channel that leads to higher voter information. 2 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical arguments on how voter information is shaped by political institutions, especially the political participation rights of the citizens. Section 3 presents the data. The empirical analysis for the EU is provided in section 4; the one for Switzerland in section 5.
Concluding remarks are offered in section 6.
Voter Information and Political Institutions
Political institutions influence voter information in a variety of ways. In representative democracies, the institutional structures usually favor the emergence of a small number of parties (often two). One essential role of political parties can be seen in reducing the voters' information costs (Downs 1957 , 93 ff.). By having an ideological position which voters can focus on, parties serve to reduce complexity: voters can choose between a few parties and need not be well informed about the whole range of policies the parties propose to pursue. In representative democracies, a variety of other information saving mechanisms exist, as already mentioned in the introduction. Representative democracies, however, are just one form of political system in the possible range from autocracies to fully direct democracies. An essential feature of political institutions is to what degree they allow citizens to directly participate in the political process, i.e.
whether citizens are just allowed to vote in elections (if at all) or whether they also have the possibility to vote on particular issues. This paper focuses on a comparison of political systems that grant citizens relatively few direct participation rights Pateman 1970 (representative democracies) with political systems that give citizens more direct participation possibilities in the form of referenda and initiatives (direct democracies).
From a theoretical point of view, voter information will be of different size and quality in more direct democracies because of changes in the supply of political information and the demand for it (see e.g. Eichenberger 1999 , Frey 1994 , Kirchgässner, Feld and Savioz 1999 . On the supply side, the possibility for voters to decide on single issues via initiatives and referenda provides incentives for potential information suppliers like the government, political parties, and especially interest groups. If they want to win a referendum, they are forced to inform the public about the reasons why they are for or against a particular policy. Thereby, it is often not enough to emphasize an ideological position, but specific information on the issue at stake has to be provided, and the arguments and information of the opponents have to be taken up and discussed. This results in a discussion process, which frequently involves politicians and citizens, usually much more often than every four years when elections take place. The political information supplied in more direct democracies will not only be quantitatively larger, but also qualitatively different. Compared to elections, referenda are less personalized, which favors the supply of issue related information. Moreover, it restricts the possibility of politicians to hide behind an image or a reputation which in representative democracies might secure them reelection. In a referendum campaign, politicians are repeatedly forced to explain their arguments for or against a concrete policy measure and cannot focus on one or two core aspects of their party program (which are often rather unspecific, like 'improving the health care system').
On the demand side, citizens ask for more political information mainly because they frequently are involved in the (often intense) discussions taking place before a referendum. Although being informed remains largely a public good also in more direct democracies, the discussion process nevertheless creates some substantial private incentives that increase the demand for information. In discussions, "having an opinion" is partly transformed into a private good, for two reasons. First, individuals consider it as a value per se to have an opinion (Hirschman 1989 ). Second, not having a certain level of information excludes an individual from discussions, or is viewed negatively by others. This is especially the case when important political issues are to be decided and thus discussions are intense. An example is the referendum on whether Switzerland should join the European Economic Area in 1992. In the weeks preceding the vote, it was almost impossible not to get involved in the fierce discussions on the subject, and consequently, the incentives to be informed were high. Evidence shows that Swiss citizens were actually better informed about the EEA and the EU after the referendum than citizens of neighboring countries already belonging to the EU (Eurobarometer Schweiz 1991, cit. in Bohnet and Frey 1994: 345) .
The theoretical arguments concerning the supply and demand of political information suggest that voters will be politically better aware of political issues when they have larger direct participation possibilities in the political process. This is, however, not to say that voters are always perfectly informed. One of the core arguments against direct democracy has always been that voters are not informed well enough to make decisions on single issues. The argument is still debated. There exists a number of well founded skepticisms, but also a variety of good arguments that even relatively low levels of voter information are sufficient for direct democratic decisions (see e.g. Lupia 2001 for a survey of the arguments). In any case, this paper is not concerned about the absolute level of voter competence and whether it is 'high enough'. Rather, a comparative institutional view is applied. In the following empirical section, we attempt to test the hypothesis that voters are relatively better informed when they live in more direct democracies.
Data
The empirical analysis is conducted in two parts. First, voter information in EU countries is studied, and second, political information levels in Switzerland are investigated. We discuss the data sets used in turn.
European Union
Data on voter information in the EU countries are obtained from the regularly conducted Eurobarometer series. The database allows assessing voters' information about political issues in two different ways. First, there is cross-section evidence on voters' "objective" information about the EU. In the so-called "mega-survey" conducted in 1996 (Reif and Marlier 1996) , about 65'000 persons living in 15 EU-countries were answers to these questions per se are rather unimportant. Still, they can be seen as good proxy measures for the awareness of political issues and the 'true' political information levels of citizens. All the questions relate to basic characteristics of the EU, and it seems very likely that they correlate with the general political information of individuals.
The answers to the ten questions are used to construct an index of "objective" political information about the EU. The index counts every correct answer as one index point, i.e. the maximum value of the index is ten (if all questions were answered correctly) and the minimum value is zero. Every "don't know" answer is counted as a "wrong"
answer. The resulting index serves as the dependent variable for the analysis of referenda's effect on the objective information citizens have on the EU. On average, the Europeans surveyed answered 3.42 questions out of 10 correctly (std. dev. 2.44).
In order to also conduct a longitudinal analysis of voter information in European countries, we use several waves of the Eurobarometer from 1992 to 1997 as a second data source (Scholz and Schmitt 2001) . Each of the in total eight Eurobarometer waves 4 available contains a standard question on the "subjective" political information level of an individual. The question asked is: "All things considered, how well informed do you feel you are about the EU, its policies, its institutions?" Answers can be given on a scale from (1) very well, (2) quite well, (3) not very well, to (4) not at all well. We recoded answers so that a high value of 4 means "very well" informed and a low value of 1 means "not at all well" informed. The resulting variable is used as the dependent variable in the analysis of a referendum's effect on the citizens' subjective political information levels over time. On average, the over 120'000 European citizens surveyed from 1992-1997 felt "not very well informed" about the EU, as indicated by the mean value of 2.14 on a scale from 1 to 4 (st.d. 0.77).
As the main explanatory variable, we are interested in referenda about the EU. and 0 for those surveyed in the wave conducted before and the waves conducted after the referendum. Thus, in the longitudinal analysis, the dummy variables capture the short term effects of a referendum on the citizens' subjective information levels in a country.
6
The Eurobarometer surveys also contain information on individual characteristics that have been shown to influence peoples' political information levels (see the next subsection for a theoretical discussion). As control variables, we include education (4 categories), income (12 categories), age (6 categories), gender, civil status (6 categories) and the type of communitiy individuals live in (3 categories) in the analysis. The 5 Norway is not included in the 1996 survey; i.e. the dummy variable used in the cross-section analysis on objective voter information includes the other six countries with a referendum only. 6 The study of long-term effects is hampered, unfortunately, by data restrictions. Norway, Sweden and Austria are only included in the Eurobarometer surveys after their referendum on the EU (from 1995 on), and thus a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for all waves following a referendum would amount to a country fixed effect in these cases. Moreover, the question on subjective political information is not available before 1992, leaving only one wave of observations before a referedum in the case of Denmark, Ireland and France.
Eurobarometer surveys provide information on these control variables that is made comparable across the countries surveyed.
Switzerland
The empirical analysis for Switzerland is based on a survey conducted by political The answers to the three questions are used to construct an index of political information for Switzerland similar to the one for the EU. The index counts every correct answer as one index point, i.e. the maximum value of the index is three (if all questions were answered correctly) and the minimum value is zero. Every "refused answer" is counted as a "wrong answer". This procedure is chosen because a large number of respondents (38 %) refuses to answer at least one of the three questions. Not answering a question can be seen as a relatively cheap way of avoiding a wrong answer.
Thus, it seems unproblematic to combine 'refused answers' and 'wrong answers' into a single category. 8 The resulting index on political information serves as the dependent variable for the analysis on voter information in Switzerland.
The main factor that is put forward to explain citizens' information levels are scale between one and six. 9 The highest value of the democracy index is observed for canton Basle Land (5.69), and the lowest direct participation rights are to be found in canton Geneva (1.75). For all cantons, the index averages 4.22 points (std. dev. 1.24).
The index has been applied in a series of other papers, e.g. Frey and Stutzer (2000), Küttel and Kugler (2001) , Schaltegger and Feld (2001) . Here, the degree of direct political participation possibilities is used to explain the differences in information levels observed among Swiss citizens.
The survey provides information on other characteristics that political economists have identified as important determinants of voter information. Individuals state their educational level (8 categories) and their gross household income (11 categories); for both variables, voter information is likely to increase. Moreover, information can be expected to be less costly to individuals when they are members of a political party, or when they are married or living with a partner (for theoretical arguments supporting these predictions see Matsusaka 1995) . 10 There is no clear prediction for naturalized citizens versus native citizens. While the latter have grown up with political rights, naturalized citizens learn a lot about political institutions during the naturalization process. Apart from these variables, the survey includes information on age, gender, and place of residence of individuals (city, agglomeration or countryside). We complement the data set with information on the population size of the cantons individuals live in.
The effects of population size are not unambiguous from a theoretical viewpoint:
information might be higher in small cantons, because social interaction is more intense. 9 The index measures the different barriers for the citizens to enter the political process via initiatives and referenda across cantons. It is based on the four main legal instruments to directly influence the political process in Swiss cantons: (i) the initiative to change a canton's constitution, (ii) the initiative to change a canton's laws, (iii) the compulsory or optional referendum to prevent new law or the changing of law and (iv) the compulsory or optional referendum to prevent new state expenditure. Barriers are measured in terms of (i) the number of signatures necessary to launch an instrument (absolute and relative to the number of citizens with the right to vote), (ii) the legally allowed time span to collect the signatures and (iii) the level of new expenditure per head allowing a financial referendum. Each of these restrictions is evaluated on a six point scale: "one" indicates a high barrier, "six" a low one (compulsory referenda are treated like referenda with the lowest possible barrier). The resulting non-weighted ratings represent the measure used for direct democratic rights in Swiss cantons.
On the other hand, individuals in large cantons might benefit from economies of scale in information production. As socio-demographic characteristics and other control variables are not available for all the individuals interviewed, the final sample for the empirical test of institutional effects on voter information consists of 6,447 usable observations.
In a second step, we also assess whether differences in participation possibilities affect the intensity of political discussions among citizens. Here, the dependent variable consists of the individual answers to the question: "Did you discuss with other people which party or candidates to vote for?" Answers are coded 'yes' or 'no'. However, in this case, only individuals who actually voted in the general election were asked the question. This reduces the sample size to 4016 observations. Note also that the question relates to discussions about the general election, and not about an initiative or a referendum. Nevertheless, we consider this dependent variable as a sufficient proxy measure to present preliminary evidence on discussion intensity, which in the literature is seen as the main transmission channel that leads to higher voter information in more direct democracies.
Empirical Analysis for the European Union

Referenda and Objective Information about the EU
To get a first impression on the relationship between referenda and the objective information citizens have about the EU, we present a "political information league 11 Ignoring the clustering in the estimation model is likely to produce downward biased standard errors, due to the effects of aggregate variables on individual data (Moulton 1990 ). To get unbiased standard errors for the aggregate country dummies, countries are used as sampling units. Treaty, but only scores twelveth. With respect to non-referenda countries, Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany make it into the first eight, whereas the remaining six nonreferenda countries are to be found in the bottom half of the distribution. The same picture emerges if referenda countries as a group are compared to non-referenda countries: Citizens in the six countries that allowed for a referendum on the Maastricht
Treaty answer on average 3.82 questions out of 10 correctly, compared to 3.21 in nonreferenda countries (p<0.01, two-sample t-test).
In table 2, the positive relationship between referenda and objective information is investigated in more detail. The first column presents the results of a weighted ordered probit regression that includes the dummy variable "referendum" which is equal to 1 for the countries that had a referendum before 1996, and 0 otherwise. The regression also controls for the effects of income, education, age and other determinants. In the second column of If we include an additional dummy variable for the EU host countries Luxembourg and Belgium, the coefficient on the referendum variable is significant at the 95%-level. 13 The marginal effect indicates the change in the probability that an individual is better informed by one index point when the independent variable increases by one unit. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as an increase in the share of persons that answer a given number of questions correctly. In the case of dummy variables, the marginal effect is evaluated with respect to the reference group. The marginal effects Denmark, which held their referenda closer to the date when the survey was conducted.
In contrast, the citizens of France and Irleand, who voted on the Maastricht Treaty already in 1992, are on average not better informed than people in non-referenda countries. This indicates that the positive information effects of referenda fade over time when they are a rare event.
It is also noteworthy that the regressions produce the theoretically expected results for the control variables used. Information is strongly increasing in education, income, and age, indicating that the dependent variable does not only capture random differences in objective information about the EU.
The evidence presented in table 1 and 2 gives a first indication that citizens seem to be better informed about the EU ceteris paribus when they had a possibility to vote on EU issues. However, some alternative explanations might be put forward. For example, one might argue that historical reasons account for the observed differences between countries. The longer a country has been a member of the EU, the more have its citizens been exposed to information about the EU. Similarly, one may hypothesize that the involvement in EU institutions raises information levels. It is noteworthy, however, that arguments along these lines would rather strengthen our point. On the one hand, the citizens of Austria, Finland, and Sweden are found to be well informed about the EU although these countries only joined in 1995. On the other hand, the involvement in EU institutions might explain why also some non-referenda countries are found in the upper half of the league table; indeed, the high ranking countries Luxembourg and Belgium host most of the EU organizations.
Referenda and Subjective Information about the EU
In order to provide complementary evidence, this subsection studies the relationship between referenda and information in a longitudinal setting. It is investigated how provided in table 2 indicate the average probability change over all eleven scores of the voter information index.
referenda change the information levels of citizens over time, i.e. information levels before and after a referendum are compared. As objective information is only available in 1996, we use a measure of subjectively perceived information levels included in eight
Eurobarometer waves between 1992 and 1997 instead. For each of the countries that had a referendum, it is studied how the average subjective information levels of citizens changed in the survey wave subsequent to the referendum. Table 3 contains the results of the longitudinal analysis of referenda's effect on information. Again, a weighted ordered probit regression is estimated that produces representative results at the country level. The regression includes fixed effects for each country to account for unobserved heterogeneity between countries, and time effects for each Eurobarometer wave to capture potential changes in information levels common to all EU citizens. Estimated standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the country level. The effects of referenda are estimated using dummy variables for each country and referendum: if a referendum has taken place in a country, all observations of the subsequent survey wave in this country are given the value 1. In contrast to the cross-section analysis, the regression does not include control variables. On the one hand, the control variables are not available for each of the waves used. On the other hand, the analysis focuses on the differential effect that a referendum has on the population in a country, compared to citizens of other countries without a referendum at that time. As the levels of income, education, and other characteristics do not rapidly change from one survey wave to another, one can plausibly assume that the regression produces unbiased results even when excluding these control variables. Table 3 shows that for almost every referendum held in European countries between 1992 and 1997, a positive effect on citizens' perceived information levels can be identified. With the exception of the referendum held in France in 1992, citizens find themselves in every case better informed about the EU, its institutions, and its policies after they were given the possibility to vote on a EU issue. The estimated coefficients are in general significant and of considerable magnitude. The marginal effects indicated in table 3 range from 1.6% in the case of the two Danish and the Irish referendum up to 6.9% for the Norwegian referendum. Thus, referenda contribute to a significant extent to the information citizens feel they have about the EU. Although this result is reached using subjectively reported levels of information as the dependent variable, it corresponds well to the finding that citizens in referenda countries are also objectively better informed about the EU.
Empirical Analysis for Switzerland
Institutional Effects on Voter Information in Switzerland
To provide further evidence on the relationship between political participation possibilities and voter information, we focus on a second institutional context and investigate political information in Switzerland. Switzerland is especially suited for our analysis because unique institutional variation exists: as described in the data section, there are considerable differences with respect to democratic participation rights between the 26 Swiss cantons. We hypothesize that the extent of direct democracy in a canton positively correlates with a measure on voter information we obtain from a large survey conducted in 1995.
To get an intuition of the relationship between political participation possibilities and voter information, results are first presented graphically. (ii) The reported effect is an average over the whole sample, i.e. the institutional factor is important in an aggregate sense. In comparison, being better educated 'only' raises the information levels of those who have actually got a better education. with theoretical predictions. The overall regression thus seems reliable, and the dependent variable obviously captures more than just random differences in citizens' information levels. For education and income, we both find positive and statistically significant effects. Voter information is more or less monotonically increasing in education, and the size of the marginal effects confirms that education is indeed an important predictor of information levels. The results for income are similar, although the marginal effects are smaller and information seems not to monotonically increase in
income. An explanation for this might be that education and income are highly correlated. Voter information is also found to be significantly higher when an individual is a member of a political party, whereby causality for this partial correlation can go in both directions. Furthermore, it is found that individuals who are born as Swiss citizens are better informed than those who are naturalized later in life. We get somewhat ambiguous effects for the martial status variables: singles are relatively best informed, although they cannot profit from potential economies of scale in information production that emerge from living with a partner or being married. On the other hand, married people, and those living with a partner, are better informed than divorced or widowed individuals. Voter information, furthermore, is found to increase in age and to be higher against their interest and are more willing to accept the institutions through which the outcomes have been generated.
Sensitivity Analysis for the Swiss Results
In First, we analyze citizens' information for every question that is included in the index separately. The results are presented in the specifications (2) to (4) in Overall, these countervailing effects cancel out, resulting in essentially a zero relationship between political participation possibilities and overall voter information.
This leads us to conclude that our main results for the 1996 sample can be considered as sufficiently reliable. 
Institutional Effects on Discussion Intensity in Swiss Cantons
One transmission channel that leads from extended political participation rights to higher voter information is the discussion process. Private and public political discussion affects voter information levels mainly on the demand side: when citizens are more frequently involved in political discussions, "having an opinion" and being informed is transformed partly into a private good. In this subsection, it is empirically investigated whether political participation possibilities indeed influence discussion intensity among citizens. Men and senior citizens thus seem to discuss political issues less with others, but nevertheless are better informed voters. These are two interesting findings in themselves. While there is no according prediction from our underlying model, there seem to be reasonable arguments along which the findings could be further analyzed.
First, it might well be argued that people accumulate political information over their life while being less and less involved in political discussions. Second, women and men may use different channels to gather political information. Men, e.g., might use media more intensively than women to get political information.
We again conduct robustness checks to analyze the sensitivity of the findings on discussion intensity.
First, the basic specification (as presented in table 6) is augmented with two dummy variables on language group membership, one for French speaking and one for Italian speaking citizens. The reasons for this are largely the same as already discussed above:
cultural differences between the language groups might influence discussion intensity in the French and Italian parts of Switzerland, or it might be lower because these citizens feel they are often overruled by the German speaking majority and are thus less interested in national politics. The estimated effect for the institutional variable is indeed sensitive to the inclusion of language group differences. The coefficient falls to 0.01 (t=0.299), whereas French speaking (coeff.=-0.518, t=-4.189) and Italian speaking citizens (coeff.=-0.236, t=-4.966) discuss political issues substantially less with their fellow citizens. Due to the low variation within the French speaking cantons in the extent of political participation rights, it is again not possible to empirically distinguish in conclusion whether this is the case because these citizens actually have lower political participation rights, or whether this just reflects cultural differences. Both explanations might be correct. We have to conclude that the institutional effect on discussion intensity is not reliable enough to make clear statements. As the question on discussion intensity was not asked in the 2000 survey, we cannot replicate the findings using the survey conducted after the 2000 elections.
Conclusions
This paper empirically tests the theoretically well founded notion that voters are better informed when they have a larger say in the political process. Using survey data from the EU and Switzerland, we find supportive evidence for this prediction. Voter information is to a substantial degree endogenous to the political institutions under which citizens live.
Referenda on the Maastricht Treaty and on Joining the EU have substantially increased citizens factual information about the EU as well as their subjectively perceived level of information. The size of the estimated effect of a referendum in the EU on "objective" information is comparable to the difference in political information between an individual in a middle income category and an individual in the lowest income category.
In Switzerland, larger direct participation possibilities result in higher information levels. Comparing the size of the effects, we find that the influence of more political participation possibilities is substantial: the range is comparable to an increase in education from just compulsory education to having attended a diploma school, or an increase in household income from 5000 SFr. to 9000 SFr. Various sensitivity checks support the general result. However, the institutional effect of extended participation possibilities on voter information is found to be sensitive to replication with a similar, although much smaller, survey conducted in 2000. An empirical explanation for the difference in results is provided.
Apart from the institutional variables, the regressions include several other control variables that political economists have identified as important determinants of voter information, e.g. education, income or party membership. For these control variables, we find significant effects with the expected signs, indicating that our dependent variable captures more than just random differences in voter information. Looking at the joint findings for the EU and Switzerland, we believe that our study presents for the first time systematic empirical evidence that voters are better informed when they have a larger say in politics. The findings complement the theoretical arguments and the circumstancial evidence previously advanced in the literature.
The findings have important policy consequences. If voter information is to be increased (a claim that is regularly heard), governments and policy advisors often focus on information campaigns on specific issues they themselves find important. However, information campaigns often only provide superficial information and consist of oneway communication, thus hardly leading to long term increases in voter information levels. Our results point to an institutional alternative. Higher voter information might be achieved by giving citizens more direct participation possibilities.
We also investigate whether political discussion intensity among citizens should be treated as endogenously determined by political institutions. Private and public discussions about political issues are presumed to be a major transmission mechanism for the effect of direct democratic institutions on voter information. First findings seem to support the hypothesis. However, the empirical results are sensitive to the inclusion of differences between the three large Swiss language regions over and above the institutional variation. While further research is needed, current evidence suggests that a promising remedy for an often claimed voter alienation and apathy in politics could be seen in giving citizens more political participation rights.
